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In Newberry v. Newberry,1 an action to annul a marriage
of over twenty years, the husband asserted that the marriage
was void because a divorce obtained by defendant wife in
Nevada prior to the present marriage was invalid for'the lack
of jurisdiction. Defendant was a resident of South Carolina
prior to her divorce. She complied with the Nevada residency
requirements and obtained a divorce. Shortly thereafter she
returned to South Carolina. Plaintiff relied on lack of intent
to establish a bona fide domicile to invalidate the Nevada
divorce. Defendant offered explanations tending to show that
her return was not inconsistent with an intent on her part to
establish a bona fide domicile in Nevada. However, the court
concluded that a domicile argument need not be considered,
since the plaintiff was barred by laches 2 from prevailing in
his action. The plaintiff had full knowledge of the Nevada
divorce and the circumstances surrounding it, and in fact,
did opportune the defendant to return to South Carolina and
thereafter married and enjoyed the rights and privileges as
defendant's husband for over twenty years. The court quoted
from Grant v. Grant3 that "The safety of society demands
that one who seeks to overthrow an apparently valid decree
of divorce should proceed with the utmost promptness upon
discovery of facts claimed to show its invalidity.
Richardson v. Richardson4 involved an action for divorce
based on the grounds of physical cruelty. The plaintiff wife
was struck several times by her husband during an altercation
involving both parents and a daughter. The plaintiff was the
only witness on her behalf and gave testimony that her in-
juries were minor and that she sought no medical treatment.
She gave conflicting testimony as to the intent of the defen-
dant husband in striking her, and at one point, agreed the
blows were accidental. No testimony was given to the effect
1. 257 S.C. 202, 184 S.E2d 704 (1971).
2. Jannino v. Jannino, 234 S.C. 352, 108 S.E.2d 572 (1959).
3. 233 S.C. 433, 436, 105 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1958).
4. 258 S.C. 135, 187 S.E.2d 528 (1972).
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that she was in fear of serious bodily harm if she continued
cohabitation with defendant. It would seem that this alone
under Guinnan v. Guinnan would be reason to deny the relief
sought. But the court found it sufficient to apply the rule
"that a single act of physical cruelty 'will not ordinarily con-
stitute grounds for divorce, unless it is so severe and atrocious
a- to endanger life, or unless the act indicates an intention to
do serious bodily harm."6 Such burden was not met by the
plaintiff since no corroboration of her testimony was offered. 7
In Shaw v. Shaw s the lower court relied upon an amend-
ment to the South Carolina Constitution 9 granting divorce via
a three year separation of the spouses. The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the separation in the
instant case was the result of insanity and the subsequent con-
finement of defendant wife in the South Carolina State Hos-
pital, where she remains. The court reasoned that to grant
a divorce on the basis of such a separation would be to allow
divorce on the ground of insanity in the guise of separation.
The court referred to Nolletti v. Nollettil0 which stated that
the constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legis-
lature to allow divorce upon any ground other than those
enumerated therein. The Supreme Court of Virginia in the
case of Crittenden v. Crittenden1 addressed itself to an iden-
tical question and reasoned that the separation contemplated
by the State of Virginia Code section 20-91 (9)12 must be by
parties sufficiently competent to be conscious of the fact that
the act of separation has occurred. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court agreed with that conclusion and stated that one
who has been separated from his spouse as the result of com-
mitment for mental incompetence is not, as a matter of law,
5. 254 S.C. 554, 176 S.E.2d 173 (1970). Here, the wife did not testify that
she was in fear of her husband either before, during or after the altercation
relied on and thus failed to establish physical cruelty within the meaning of
the statute.
6. 258 S.C. 135, 138, 187 S.E2d 528, 530 (1972).
7. Bankhead v. Bankhead, 254 S.C. 78, 173 S.E2d 372 (1970). Corrobora-
tion of testimony necessary to meet burden of establishing physical cruelty by a
preponderance of the evidence.
8. 256 S.C. 453, 182 S.E.2d 865 (1971).
9. S.C. CoDE ANXN. Sec. 20-101 (5) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
10. 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11 (1963).
11. 210 Va. 76, 168 S.E.2d 115 (1969).
12. VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 20-91 (9) (1950).
19721
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss4/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
capable of being conscious of the fact that a separation has
occurred.
B. Alimony and Support
Sheout v. Shecut"3 involved an appeal by the husband
from a judgment of the lower court granting the wife a di-
vorce. The divorce decree provided for alimony, child support,
and counsel fees. The order of the lower court did not allocate
the amount awarded between wife and the children, nor the
husband's financial obligations in connection with the wife's
continued occupancy of a provided residence. Furthermore,
the order was mute as to whether the award included college
expenses of a child or that such expenses were in addition to
the monthly payments. Thus, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the record was so
inadequate and the findings so indefinite as to afford no
proper basis for review. In remanding the case the court
found it necessary to dispose of the question raised by appel-
lant as to whether a judgment in a prior action (the denial of
a divorce and refusal to set an amount for support based on
the findings that the husband was "adequately supporting
his family"), is res judicata with respect to the amount ap-
pellant is now required to pay for support. The court held
that the defense of res judicata is an affirmative defense and
must be pleaded. 14 It was not pleaded in appellant's answer
and thus was not considered a bar to the instant action.
Fender v. Fender15 was a proceeding by the divorced wife
requesting an increase of alimony and child support payments
on the ground of a change in conditions as defined by the
South Carolina legislature.' 6 Evidence was given to effect
that the husband's financial ability had greatly increased.
The need for additional funds for the wife and child was also
supported by the findings. The lower court modified the
decree in conformity therewith. The South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the modification in reliance on the pertinent
South Carolina Code section' 7 and the confirming power of
the court to modify a decree for alimony based upon an agree-
13. 257 S.C. 354, 185 S.E.2d 895 (1971).
14. Connell v. Connell, 249 S.C. 162, 153 S.E2d 396 (1967).
15. 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971).
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ment of the parties as sustained in Jetter v. Jetter.18 The
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
requirement that the husband provide security on the grounds
that there was no showing that such security was necessary
to insure compliance with the order of the court.
Skinner v. Skinner 9 resulted in the South Carolina Su-
preme Court reversing and remanding the lower court's award
of an increase in alimony on motion by the wife. The notice
of motion in this case was for an order amending the support
provisions of the prior decree on the sole ground of inade-
quacy. There was no motion to reconsider the factual findings
nor allegation of change in conditions. Littlejohn, J., con-
curred with the opinion that when the judge's order was filed
with the clerk of the court it became a final judgment. He
further stated that no authority had been cited for a judge to
review his own decrees in South Carolina.
II. PARENT AND CHILD
In Underwood v. Underwood20 a wife petitioned for a
modification of consent order in the divorce action, asserting
that she was unable to continue to reside in a beach home
provided by her husband because it was in an isolated area
that she believed unsafe. The lower court entered the modifi-
cation. However, the wife had prayed in the divorce action
for the right to live in the beach home and the South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the grounds that
the wife should have and must have foreseen that people leave
their ,beach homes in the fall and it could not be said that
something unforeseeable had taken place. Therefore she did
not show a change of circumstances sufficient to justify mod-
ification of the prior consent order.
Care and thought are required of those who come before
the court to seek alimony and support and the court in its
quest to supply a lasting decree which is just to all parties
18. 193 S.C. 278, 8 S.E.2d 490 (1940). However, Jetter was a decree for
legal separation as neither divorce a tnensa et thoro nor divorce a viniculo
inatrimonii were permissible at that time. In legal separation the court has an
inherent right to modify support and separate maintenance without reservation
of such power in the decree.
19. 257 S.C. 544, 186 S.E.2d 523 (1972).
20. 257 S.C. 235, 185 S.E.2d 370 (1971).
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has developed and here follows the necessity of a showing of
changed circumstances to support a modification of decree.
Although the ruling here may be just as to the mother's inter-
.ests and the court's reasonable desire to forestall frivolous
requests for modification, the safety and welfare of the chil-
,dren in the beach environment during winter should have
taken precedence over other considerations.
In Sharpe v. Sharpe2' the divorced father of an infant
child desired modification of a decree allowing visitation
rights to that of full custody between June 15 and August 15
of each year. The father grounded his action on a change of
circumstances resulting from the divorced mother's moving
to Texas, taking their child. The lower court awarded summer
custody to the father. The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, stating that there was no showing
of unfitness of either parent, nor that the move to Texas was
made to deprive the father of visitation rights. Evidence was
offered that the move was in the best interest of the mother
and child by the virtue of a better job for the mother and
proper care of the child. In Mixson v. Mixso=22 the court laid
down the rule, followed here, that divided custody is to be
avoided if possible as not in the best interest of the child, and
further modification of custody must be considered in light
of the personal welfare of the child.
KEITH J. PERRY
21. 256 S.C. 517, 183 S.E.2d 325 (1971).
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